This paper introduces means of quantifying global trend of proliferation in antitrust laws, and introduces measures to assess the presence of such laws across a large set of countries. In particular, the Antitrust Law Index maps the presence of "laws on the book" into a numerical measure of competition regimes by assigning binomial scores for the presence of particular laws in a jurisdiction, and then summing the individual components to yield a total score. The countries with the highest index values do not necessarily represent the strongest antitrust laws. The results do suggest that the impetus for adopting antitrust laws appears related to the imposed guidelines of supranational bodies, in particular the requirements of the European Union. 
Introduction
International antitrust as a policy concern, encompassing domestic competition regimes and multinational economic effects, has grown with the size and complexity of global business activity. Concurrent to the recent merger "wave" has been an increase in the number of countries that have antitrust laws, so that the number of mergers requiring filing in multiple jurisdictions increased exponentially in the 1990s.
1 Mergers and acquisitions between multinational firms have potential global impacts that increase with the degree of economic integration among countries. Moreover, anticompetitive activity by multinational firms generally has international spillovers, with policies in one country being transmitted by international business to consumers in any number of countries.
A relative dearth of analytical research accompanies this proliferation of antitrust laws and the increasing role of transnational governance. Empirical investigations into the causes and consequences of international antitrust policy lag behind these global trends, in large part suffering from a lack of quantification. Measures of governance have been developed in recent years to allow empirical studies of many political or legal activities, and I intend to add competition policy to the list. 2 Recent empirical studies have used various methods to quantify antitrust laws, employing survey methods or binary variables to indicate the presence of a policy. I discuss the value of such tools, and introduce some potential measures to assess the presence of antitrust laws across a large set of countries.
1 Rowley and Baker (2001) 2 The breadth of measures in governance is sufficiently large that Kauffman, Kraay, and Zoido-Lobatón (1999) compiled several hundred cross-country indicators. These include such subjects as corruption, ruleof-law, and the effectiveness of government.
Fundamentals of Quantifying Antitrust Regimes
Jurisdictions with antitrust regimes have proliferated over the past decade. The number of countries with antitrust regimes has expanded from 35 in 1995 to over 100 in 2003, with many others in the process of drafting laws. 3 Competition agencies have been established in each of the transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe, with a considerable amount of research focusing specifically on this trend towards market institutions in the former communist world. 4 There has also been a trend towards institutional reform of antitrust in Latin America and East Asia. The rise in jurisdictions that regulate commercial activity has generated a greater demand in the international community for a coherent framework to handle the myriad national policies now in effect.
Much of the discussion on continued trends in multi-jurisdictional regulation focuses on transnational governance. 5 This has lead to multilateral efforts to improve coherence in international competition policy, with institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Bank, and the European Union engaging in such efforts. 6 The International Competition Network (ICN) is a recently established group that has arisen to deal specifically with transnational issues in antitrust. 7 Within this 3 Centre for Competition, Investment, and Economic Regulation (2003) 4 See Fingleton, Fox, Neven, and Seabright (1998) and Dutz and Vagiliasindi (2000) as examples within a much larger literature. 5 See Graham and Richardson (1997) and Hoeckman (1997) as examples. 6 A primary concern of multilateral organizations like the WTO regarding competition policy involves the impact on market access. Liberal trade regimes can have procompetitive effects that substitute for antitrust enforcement. As trade restrictions are lifted, market power by domestic firms may be dissipated in the global economy. To the extent that competition policy relates to the contestability of markets, however, it may be at odds with similar traditional aspects of trade liberalization. In particular, Hoeckman (1997) notes that trade policy focuses on "competitors" (i.e., the factors of production), not necessarily "competition" itself. 7 See Djelic and Kleiner (2003) industries, may generally be more efficient than one seeking to preserve a large number of small firms at all costs. One policy focuses on overall welfare, and the other on specific preferences about market structure. This demonstrates complexities in antitrust policy, both within and across national borders.
Antitrust laws in developed countries with consistent goals towards economic efficiency may also be quite diverse. As discussed in Jenny (1995) , national competition laws include value judgments about domestic sociopolitical balance. This often leads to politically fragile policies that are sources of legal uncertainty and are economically costly to society. Various influences on the regime carry inconsistent goals, with a resulting antitrust policy may impose constraints on firms that impede the efficient allocation of scarce resources.
Consequently, one must be careful in keeping competition policy within the context of national or regional goals and preferences.
9
In measuring an antitrust regime, 8 See Gal (2003) 9 Some may object to a description of "national preferences". This phrase is often employed by international economists to describe the vector of influences that determine policy in a particular country. It does not suggest or even assume homogeneity of preferences for all individuals subject to that policy.
tradeoffs must be made between general and specific approaches. An analysis of a single competition regime, or of policies in a few countries with similar backgrounds, can be quite detailed. 10 As the analysis shifts outward to include more regimes across different regions, the specific details of a regime must be sacrificed to accommodate more universal policies.
The role and effectiveness of a competition regime carries important differences across countries that may reflect the business culture of various regions. 10 Fingleton, et. al (1998) , as discussed below, provide a comprehensive analysis of the four similarlysituated Central European countries. 11 For example, competition policy in Latin American must account for a pervasive regulatory environment, which affects the enforcement of many policies. See de Leon (2002) . 12 See Pittman (1998) The term "Competition Culture" has been coined to describe the social and political climate for antitrust policy, which could include political will, regulatory expertise, efficient enforcement, control of corruption, and sufficient resources dedicated to the task. One study 13 suggests that ineffective competition policy regimes could be attributed to a domestic culture that lacks certain foundations for a competitive environment, not limited to institutions and laws. 
Breadth versus Depth of Surveys
13 See CUTS: The Centre for Competition, Investment, and Economic Regulation (2003) 14 One must, of course, be careful not to relegate all cross-country differences to "culture". The best step forward is to identify which aspects of competition culture carry the greatest weight, and study their impacts accordingly.
Existing survey evidence demonstrates the interaction between the general and the specific approaches to measurement. Surveys involving a smaller set of countries can have greater depth of analysis. However, in order to increase the breadth of the survey and facilitate comparisons with a larger group of countries, many specifics must be relaxed to accommodate differences across regions.
The most trenchant survey analysis to date is on transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe, which was administered by Dutz and Vagliasindi (2000) in collaboration with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD).
15
The survey covers the enforcement, advocacy, and institutional effectiveness of competition policy for eighteen countries. These countries share relatively similar geography, history, and culture, which enhances the value of comparisons between regimes. product market competition, suggesting that such policies may substitute for competition policy.
The Global Competition Review publishes a survey, shown in Table 1 Table 2 .
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One must consider the objective in developing cross-country comparisons.
Development or transition researchers will be interested in focusing on a smaller set of 16 Global Competition Review (2000 , 2001 17 The other three are: Argentina, Israel, and South Africa. The GCR is expanding the coverage of its survey to include Latin American countries, and a wider range of topics. See Global Competition Review (2003) . 18 Nicholson (2003) uses the results of this survey in a cross-country analysis of the impact of competition policy on foreign direct investment and cross-border licensing.
countries particular to specific issues. The EBRD survey was particularly suited to answering questions and concerns specific to transition economies. International economists may seek explanations of broad trends, such as the impact of competition regimes across countries or regions. The WEF survey is a useful means for large crosssectional studies, but lacks scholarly rigor for in-depth analysis. competition, but do affect the market structure of a domestic economy, in particular the number of firms. This market structure, in turn, affects the industry markup.
Universality of Binary Variables

Input and Output Measures
Input measures have great potential for empirical work, but trustworthy data is difficult to obtain for a large number of countries. Fingleton, Fox, Neven, and Seabright (1998) The comparisons are in many ways justified because each of the four countries is at a similar level of development, both in its levels of GDP as well as its institutions for governance. Things are considerably more complicated when making comparisons not only across different levels of development, but also across cultural divisions.
I provide some information on input measures in the appendix. The effectiveness of a regime often relates directly to the resources available for its enforcement. One way to characterize an effective regime is to examine the resources available to the institutions charged with its enforcement. Table 3 shows the extent of resources, in terms of budget and staff, for the competition agencies in 38 countries for which the data is available.
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The resources invested by a country in its competition regime shown in the table may simply reflect the size of the economy. The United States, with the largest economy in the world, has (by far) the largest national budget for competition policy, with over $300 million devoted per year. 20 To control for market size, Table 3 income. 
Quantifying Antitrust Laws
A means of quantification of antitrust regimes that has proven useful for other forms of governance, including intellectual property rights, is based on an index of national laws for that policy. In this section, I introduce an Antitrust Law Index that maps the presence of laws on the book into a measure of competition regimes. The methodology employed for the Antitrust Law Index follows similar indices that measure the relative value of intellectual property rights. 24 The practice involves assigning binomial scores for the presence of particular laws in a jurisdiction. I determine a set of criteria for laws, and then register the presence of each criterion for a selection of countries. Summing the individual components yields a total score.
Laws on the Book
22 Lapachi (2002) uses this set of questions to discuss Georgia's competition law. 23 The EU law is found in articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty of Rome, formerly articles 85 and 86. 24 See Rapp and Rozeck (1990) and Ginarte and Park (1997) .
The analysis focuses on the determinants of the written law, and less on the actual implementation of the law. Table 5 displays these criteria and the unit scale. 25 One should note that the analysis is agnostic between countries with common law or civil law traditions. Both legal systems are treated the same. 26 One potential avenue for development of this research would be to identify changed in the laws across time. Such an index would be useful in analyzing dynamic trends.
The Regime Structure includes the categories of scope, structure, and available remedies. This dimension gives an indication of the political and legal capacity for the antitrust regime. Merger Policy includes notification, assessment criteria, and rights of private enforcement. Dominance and Restrictive Trade Practices include related aspects of anticompetitive practices. These categories intend to describe a wide breadth of competition policy, with an ensuing index that captures the strength of national laws.
The first three categories in Table 5 relate to the Regime Structure. The scope indicates the breadth to which the laws apply. In particular, this covers whether the laws empower coverage for activities by foreign firms with activity that affects consumers in the domestic market. The criteria for a threshold for a response may also indicate the scope of laws, but currently it appears not to be directly comparable across countries.
Stronger competition policy could also be indicated by the nature of the remedies or sanctions available. Units are awarded for the power to fine, to imprison, and to force divestiture.
Regime Structure also includes an indicator for the role of private enforcement in national antitrust laws, which offers a further check towards ensuring competitive markets. Third parties with a direct interest in alleged anticompetitive practices have a market-based incentive to seek fair outcomes in private litigation, and laws that allow for private enforcement suggest a greater role in the economy for competition policy. Thus, I
include three indicators within the dimension for private enforcement -whether third parties can initiate action, can obtain remedies, or can take part in the proceedings of a case.
The second major dimension is Merger Policy. The notification requirements capture the regulations concerning two merging firms appraising the competition authority to their intentions. The two broad categories indicate whether notification is mandatory or voluntary. Some national laws do not mention notification at all, and receive zero units. One point is granted for voluntary or mandatory notification, but since mandatory regimes must necessarily be pre-merger or post-merger, such regimes always score higher.
The assessment criteria measure the tools used by antitrust authorities to indicate the potential impacts of a merger. I use three categories of merger control rules: market dominance, substantial lessening of competition, and public interest, as well as one for "other" criteria. The latter captures such policies as in Belgium, which, in addition to the dominance test, also includes the bargaining power of customers and suppliers and the maturity of the market for its substantive test. Efficiency is also included within the assessment criteria.
Particular aspects of anticompetitive practices include single-firm dominance or collusive acts that restrict trade. Dominance covers the restrictions on the activities of a single firm that include: access limit, abusive acts, price setting, price discrimination, resale price maintenance, and obstacles to entry. Restrictive trade practices covers pricefixing, tying, market division, output restraint, market sharing, eliminating competitors, collusive tendering (or bid-rigging), and supply refusal. Although some areas of enforcement may not be associated generally with competitive harm, each indicates the extent of adopted legislation.
These two lists overlap in many of the same anticompetitive behaviors, with the major distinction drawn between unilateral or collusive actions. Some national laws break down the restrictions in a very similar fashion to those suggested above; usually, these are countries that have drafted laws within the past decade and likely used the model laws as a guide. Most countries have the particular practices covered either in the single-firm dominance section of their laws, the restrictive trade practices section, or both. Ultimately, the index below registers a point if the law states anywhere that, say, "resale price maintenance" is regulated, even if it is not listed directly within the singlefirm dominance articles of the competition law. Table 6 in the appendix lists the index for the 52 jurisdictions in the sample, from highest to lowest. The number of countries is determined by accessibility of the set of laws. The most striking aspect of the index is that the top is dominated by transition economies in Central and Eastern Europe. As mentioned above, many transition economies have simply adopted language from the Treaty of Rome for their domestic laws -language which mirrors the "model" laws used for the present selection criteria.
This index of national laws, a plausible rendition of the legal basis for antitrust, provides
little information about what is understood to be effective competition policy in various countries. Given the existence of these laws, the question is whether they are associated with effective policy.
Determinants of the Antitrust Law Index
Regarding the association with effective policy, consider the relationship between the legal index and the WEF survey value discussed above. The correlation between the legal index and the WEF survey, for the 43 overlapping countries, is -0.200. Countries with more laws are apparently less likely to have policy described as effective. One plausible explanation may be the resources that are available for these institutions, and the disparities in resources devoted to enforcement, which depends in part on the overall wealth of the national economy. Traditionally, indices related to national governance are highly correlated with national wealth. Higher-income countries are usually associated with stronger IPRs, stronger control of corruption, and stronger rule of law.
This holds, to a degree, for the legal index. Regressing it against GNP yields:
(1) ANTITRUST = 13.28 + 0.524*GNP, R 2 =0.059
with statistical significance at 90% confidence. This suggests that there may be some influence of national income on the score for the legal index.
Note that regressing the index against GNP and GNP-squared yields:
(2) ANTITRUST = 14.05 -1.616*GNP + 0.236*GNP 2 , R 2 =0.149
with statistical significance for both variables at 95% confidence. This suggests a nonlinear relationship between GNP and the legal index, such that very poor and very rich countries have more laws on the books, while middle-income countries have fewer competition laws.
Finally, Table 7 lists the mean index for five major regions of the world, along with standard deviations from the mean. Note that Africa features some of the highest indices, driven by the strength of the laws in Kenya and South Africa. Latin American countries apparently have laws that meet relatively fewer of the criteria.
Conclusion
The Graham and Richardson (1997) outline cultural differences in such policy. They describe the market system as "socially populated, socially rooted, socially conditioned, and socially constructed", and variances in regulatory practices such as competition policy may reflect social differences. Understanding the determinants of antitrust regimes will prove extremely useful for analyzing domestic market structures and for developing coherence in international agreements. Quantifying antitrust regimes can also serve to explain the relative value in drafting laws and policies to conform across national borders. Global Competition Review (2003) . Some calculations performed by Russ Damtoft. National Income measured in PPP GDP values from the World Development Indicators. Note that for some regimes, the budget and/or staff figures include consumer protection. *In order to account for the differences in magnitude between budget dedicated to competition policy and national income (PPP) measures, the values for Budget/National Income are listed as percentages, multiplied by 10 4 . For example, New Zealand's value of 142.9 indicates that the budget for competition policy in New Zealand represents 0.0143% of its national income. (2) 13.00 0.00 Latin America (9) 11.56 4.07
